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I. INTRODUCTION

With the end of the War in Iraq announced by sitting President
Barack Obama in 20111 and the withdrawal of American troops by the
end of December 2011,2 another opportunity arises for accountability
for former President George W. Bush for instigating that war.
Accountability can be imagined in many forms-international or
foreign tribunal, domestic political accountability, or domestic criminal
prosecution. Achieving accountability abroad or domestically for a
former U.S. President has its challenges.
An unexplored avenue for accountability through complementarity
in American federalism is the state criminal prosecution of a former
President. This alternative path conducted in appropriate circumstances
appears to be foreseen in our constitutional structure, assuring the
double protection of the rights of the People as was envisioned by
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.
Based on a research report originally prepared at the invitation of
Vincent Bugliosi,3 this Article explores the opportunities and hurdles
for a state criminal prosecution of former President George W. Bush for
ordinary state crimes of conspiracy to commit murder and murder for
the deaths of American soldiers in the War in Iraq.
This Article examines such a criminal prosecution through the lenses
of international law, federal law and state law. We conclude that, while
recognizing the difficulties, such a state criminal prosecution can be
done and, as a normative matter with regard to the deaths of American
soldiers in the War in Iraq, should be done.
This Article is organized in the following manner. Part 1I develops
the generic theory of the case for a prosecution of former President
Bush for conspiracy to commit murder or murder. Part III describes
how such a prosecution is consistent with U.S. international legal
obligations. Part IV describes how such a prosecution is consistent with
Presidential War Powers. Part V describes how such a prosecution is
1. Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 21,
2011, 12:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/21 /remarks-presidentending-war-iraq.
2. Remarks by the President and First Lady on the End of the War in Iraq, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Dec. 14, 2011, 12:26 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/1214/
remarks-president-and-first-lady-end-war-iraq.
3.

See generally VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE PROSECUTION OF GEORGE W. BUSH FOR

MURDER (2008). The theory of the case is also consistent with the 2008 findings of the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate. See

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ By U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL AND

MINORITY VIEWS, S. REP. 110-345, at 91 (2008), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/

110345.pdf.
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consistent with complementarity. Part VI describes the state criminal
prosecution and defenses. Part VII addresses the normative question as
to whether such a prosecution should be undertaken. Part VIII
concludes the discussion.
II. THE FALSE PRETENSES THEORY OF THE CASE

It is so unnatural for Americans to contemplate the criminal
prosecution of a former President at all, yet alone with regard to deaths
in an armed conflict and in a state criminal prosecution, that we thought
it best to start with the theory of the case. The factual predicate for the
theory of the case for the prosecution of former President George W.
Bush is:
[The Bush Administration made deliberately false statements] ...
that were directly responsible for the majority of Americans
finally becoming convinced that invading Iraq was the right thing
for America to do.
Without the approval of this majority of Americans, there is a
decent chance that Bush would not have gone to war. Indeed, that
was the very reason why Bush and his people made the
statements - to get the support of the American people.
Because of the war induced by these statements, over 100,000
American soldiers and Iraqi civilians lost their lives, and many
thousands of others have been physically or mentally disabled for
life.'
The theory of the case is that the making of severely misleading
statements by a President to lead the country into the war does not form
part of the President's or the federal government's express, implied or
inherent powers. Moreover, the severely misleading statements
demonstrate sufficient mens rea which, when coupled with the relevant
actus reus, lead to criminal liability of the individual serving as
President.
Such criminal prosecution in a state court as opposed to a federal
4. While the focus of the analysis is on the former President, the analysis would operate
mutatis mutandis for other members at an appropriate level of the former Administration.
5. BUGLIOSI, supra note 3, at 20-21; Benjamin G. Davis et al., Research Report on
CriminalProsecutionin CalforniaCourts of Former PresidentGeorge Bush for Conspiracyto
Commit Murder and Murder, University of Toledo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-12
(July 25, 2011), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981275.
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court goes to the question of the nature of the double security provided
under our Constitution to the rights of the people. The essence of the
state and federal roles in our federalism that form the backdrop for this
prosecution was expressed early on by Alexander Hamilton:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations
of the state governments, and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government. The people, by
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make
use of the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be
in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an
6
advantage which can never be too highly prized!
And James Madison:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will control each other,
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself'
This "different governments will control each other" 8 function is at
its most significant when a state is seeking to exercise its police powers
through a criminal prosecution in a state court (as contrasted to civil
process or regulatory authority) as acknowledged, if somewhat
obliquely, in Willingham v. Morgan where the Supreme Court states:
"Were this a criminal case, a more detailed showing might be necessary
because of the more compelling state interest in conducting criminal
trials in the state courts."9
The state court criminal prosecution essentially forces the issue
because of the strong state interest in not having its citizens and
residents murdered. Provided the state sovereign has established the
proper legal basis for its jurisdiction and prosecution, and even if the
matter is in a federal forum under removal, the autonomy of the state
prosecutor vis-c't-vis the federal prosecutor serves as a true double
security for the people against being sent to war under false pretenses.
6.
7.
8.
9.
below in

THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
Id.
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 n.4 (1969). The civil context is discussed
the Federal Officer Removal Act part of this Article.
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Whether the country is willing to face this type of discussion on
basic aspects of how its separation of powers and federalism work is
uncertain. The lack of action since President Polk in the Mexican
American War'o (with exception of the congressional ratification of
Lincoln's excesses in the Civil War) suggests acquiescence to actions of
the President in taking the country to war through misleading
statements.
Yet a distinction should be made between acquiescence or passivity
in the face of the enormous power of the President and the legality of
those actions under our Constitution and laws. The mere fact that
citizens or Congress have acquiesced in the past in this arena does not,
of course, mean that former President Bush acted legally and that a
criminal prosecution cannot be contemplated. It obviously is no defense
to conspiracy to commit murder or murder that a prior President
engaged in conduct similar to Bush and he got by with it. Such an
argument would not only be unavailing, but would induce derision,
even laughter. We call this theory of the case "the false pretenses
theory."
III. A STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S.
OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

In this part we analyze the U.S. obligations under international law
Louis Fisher, When Wars Begin: Misleading Statements by Presidents, 40
STUDS. Q. 171, 173-74 (2010) (providing an analysis of misleading statements
inducing the country into war going back to President James Polk and the Mexican-American
War). Of the examples cited in that work, the statements of James Polk appear to be closest to
the kind of falsity that would have to be proved in this type of criminal case. In a message to
Congress on May 11, 1846, President Polk asserted that Mexico, "after a long-continued series
of menaces [has] at last invaded our territory and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on our
own soil[,]" and claimed that "war exists." Id. at 173. Both of these assertions were false as
neither the invasion of American territory nor war (as opposed to hostilities) existed. Id. After
much effort by the Whig Party denouncing executive usurpation and deceptions (and Abraham
Lincoln's famous Spot Resolutions seeking the indication of what spot of American territory
had been invaded by Mexico), the House of Representatives, on January 3, 1848, passed an
amendment censuring Polk for "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally" beginning the MexicanAmerican War (passing by a vote of 85 to 81). Id. at 174. In all other cases of alleged
misleading statements discussed in Fisher's article, no particular consequence in Congress was
noted. In none of these cases was a criminal prosecution at the federal or state level noted. Id. at
173-74. Of course, former President Bush might use the political solution of a censure of Polk in
the House of Representatives and the absence of similar action in other settings to argue that
issues of misleading statements by a President that lead the country into war form part of the
federal government's express, implied or inherent powers that are solely subject to review in a
political process such as censure or impeachment. However, whether they occur and whatever
their outcome, these political processes for political accountability do not preclude criminal
prosecution for criminal accountability.
10.

PRESIDENTIAL
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to ascertain to what extent a prosecution under the false pretenses theory
would be consistent with international law. The U.S. obligations under
international law are outlined in 48 C.J.S International Law § 63 which
states:
The United States has a continuing obligation to observe with
entire good faith and scrupulous care all of its undertakings under
the Charter of the United Nations, including support of the
resolutions adopted by the Security Council, and the courts of the
United States are bound to accept, enforce, and protect the
powers conferred on the United Nations . . . however, the United

States Congress possesses the power to enact a statute abrogating
an aspect of treaty obligations under the United Nations Charter
A United Nations Security Council Resolution is not selfexecuting and does not confer rights on citizens of the United
States that are enforceable in a court in the absence of
implementing legislation."
A. The Charterof the UnitedNations
The Charter of the United Nations is comprised of nineteen chapters
and 111 articles.12 The most pertinent to the subject of President George
W. Bush's war waged on Iraq in March of 2003 are U.N. Charter art. 2,
paras. 4 and 7; and U.N. Charter arts. 41, 42 and 51.13
In the "Purposes and Principles" chapter of the Charter, Article 2,
paragraph 4 states "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."' 4 The U.N.'s purposes are to
promote and maintain global peace, to encourage friendly relations and
international cooperation, and to solve international problems.' 5 Thus,
the U.S. attack of Iraq in March of 2003 falls in violation of Article 2,
paragraph 4 as evidenced by a statement from the United Nations on
March 26th, 2003 which reads: "The Security Council, holding its first
debate on Iraq since hostilities began on 19 March, was called on to end
the illegal aggression and demand the immediate withdrawal of
invading forces, by an overwhelming majority of this afternoon's 45
speakers".,,16 However, the Charter also states, "[n]othing contained in
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

48 C.J.S InternationalLaw § 63 (2011).
U.N. Charter, availableat http://www.un.org/en/documents/ charter/.
U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 4, 7; arts. 41, 42, 51.
Id. art. 2, para. 4.
Id. art. 1, paras. 1-4.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds First Debate on Iraq Since
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the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any

state[.]"l 7
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, titled "Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,"
Article 41 describes the Security Council's authority to "decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures."18 Then in Article 42, the
Charter states "[s]hould the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate . . . it may take such

action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security."l Essentially, the United
Nations intends to decide when military force is or is not necessary in
solving global conflict. Many Members of the United Nations
emphasized in the March 26th, 2003 press release that the attack in Iraq
was "carried out without Council authorization [and] was a violation of
international law." 20
The U.N. Charter does, however, make an exception for force used
in self-defense. Article 51 states, "[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security." 21 This may be one of the reasons then President
George W. Bush insisted or let be strongly implied that Saddam
Hussein was connected to the terrorist attacks on New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001. Absent
involvement in those attacks, Saddam Hussein and Iraq had not made an
armed attack on the United States, strengthening the argument that the
U.S. attack on Iraq in March 2003 was in violation of the U.N. Charter.
B. U.N. Security Council Resolutions
The Security Council's resolutions are the instructions the Member
States are to follow. Failure to comply with a demand set forth in a
resolution is a breach, and the United Nations may impose

Start of Military Action; Speakers Call For Halt to Aggression, Immediate Withdrawal, U.N.
Press Release SC/7705 (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release 7705].
17. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
18. Id. art. 41.
19. Id. art. 42.
20. U.N. Press Release 7705, supranote 16.
21. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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consequences for the breach.2 2 The resolution that much of the March
2003 attacks on Iraq are based on is Security Council Resolution
1441.23 Resolution 1441 was a follow up to Resolution 687 from April
3, 1991.24 Resolution 687 recognized the threat of chemical, nuclear,
and biological weapons emanating from Iraq and demanded that the
sale, purchase, production and trade of any and all weapons of mass
destruction, including any substances related to the production of
weapons of mass destruction, cease immediately and any and all parts
of weapons or weapons currently in existence there be destroyed.2 5
Further, Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq submit a declaration of all
such weapons and production facilities and declarations of their

destruction.26
Eleven years later, Resolution 1441 was created, "[r]ecognizing the
threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction . .. poses to international security" and

declaring that "Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and
complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects
of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction[.]" 2 The
solution to Iraq's non-compliance was to afford Iraq one last chance to
become compliant with resolution 687 or to face the consequences,
which were not described.2 8
In contrast, Security Council Resolution 678 from November 29,
1990 was created to afford Iraq one last chance to comply with a
demand to withdraw from Kuwait (demanded by Resolution 660 from
August 2, 1990) and authorized Member States to "use all necessary
means to uphold and implement" the order to withdraw. 29 The U.N.
authorization for Member States to "use all necessary means"3o is
usually interpreted as the U.N. authorization of military force, an
authorization and a consequence absent from Resolution 144 1.
Resolution 1441 did not authorize Member States of the United
Nations to use military force against Iraq for its failure to fully,
accurately and completely declare the ceased production and destruction
of all weapons of mass destruction and their kin. On March 28, 2003,
the United Nations created Resolution 1472, the first paragraph of
which refers to the United States and the United Kingdom as the
1,4, 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
22. See S.C. Res. 1441,
23. Id.
24. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
25. Id. 8.
26. Id. 9.
27. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 22, introduction.
28. Id. 2, 4, 13.
1, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
29. S.C. Res. 678
30. Id. T 2.
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"Occupying Power" of Iraq. 3 1 This resolution was the first resolution
issued following the "illegal attack" on Iraq. The United Nations never
authorized the attack, but by acknowledging the United States and the
United Kingdom as the "Occupying Power," some might see the United
Nations as having impliedly consented to the war post-hoc.
However, it would be imprudent to ascribe a post-hoc ratification by
the United Nations of the Iraq War. At most, one might speak of a form
of acquiescence to the reality of the facts on the ground. This issue is
further addressed by Members of the United Nations in its press
releases.
C. The U.N. Security Council Press Releases
The press releases dated the 11th, 12th, and 26th of March 2003
provide much insight on the division over how to handle Iraq's
noncompliance with Resolution 1441. The press releases dated the 11th
and 12th were the results of a two-day debate specifically assigned to
the situation in Iraq. 32 On the first day, 28 speakers made arguments
supporting their view of whether to allow Iraq additional time to compl
with Resolution 1441 or to initiate military force and go to war.
During this meeting, Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the U.N.
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
reported that "after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there
had been an acceleration of initiatives by Iraq . . . [a]t the same time,
such initiatives . . . did not constitute 'immediate' cooperation" as

required by resolution 1441.34
Following this report, Members in turn stated their positions. The
Malaysian representative spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned
Movement and pleaded for the Council to strive for a peaceful
solution. 35 The Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States asked
"[w]hat present and looming threat existed to wage war [in Iraq] at a
time when the inspections were proceeding vigorously" and that
"[e]verything should be done to avoid that 'hideous and uneven' war,
which would devastate, destroy and destabilize the Arab region and the
entire world."36
31. S.C. Res. 1472, introduction, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (Mar. 28, 2003).
32. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Hears From 53 Speakers in Two
Days on Iraq's Disarmament; Some Stress Iraq Has Not Cooperated, Most Say Inspectors Need
More Time, U.N. Press Release SC/7687 (Mar. 12, 2003).
33. Press Release, Security Council, At Request of Non-Aligned Countries, Security
Council Hears Views of Larger UN Membership on Disarmament of Iraq, U.N. Press Release
SC/7685 (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release SC/7685].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Iran and Canada also joined in the sentiment to strive for peace.
Canada proposed "set[ting] a deadline of three weeks for Iraq to
demonstrate conclusively that it was implementing [the required] tasks
and was cooperating actively and effectively on substance," then
repeating the deadlines so long as Iraq remained compliant. 38 fran
sympathized that the disarmament should not have taken twelve years,
and that it "underst[ands] the international community's frustration[]"
but cautioned that another war in that region "should not easily or
hurriedly be decided."3 9
On the other hand, and in favor of hastened military action, "the
representative [from] Turkey called upon [the] Council members for
cohesion, which would not only serve to legitimize any action, but
would reinforce United Nations credibility and ensure the decision
reached by that body would be heard 'loud and clear' around the
globe."4 0 Additionally, the representative from Kuwait urged the United
Nations to "chang[e] its behaviour and actively cooperat[e], instead of
just pretending to do so[,]" stressing that the only winner to the U.N.
division on the matter was Iraq.41
The following day's meeting heard from several more speakers.4 2
Japan, Latvia, Georgia, and the Dominican Republic joined in support
of a draft resolution co-sponsored by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Spain which would "set a clear deadline for Iraq to
comply with its obligations or face military action."A3 Japan added that
the recent Iraqi cooperation was insufficient and that "[tihe proposed
draft resolution was truly a 'final effort' to place the consolidated
pressure of the international community on Iraq." It also stressed that
failure to adopt the draft and the continued division of the U.N.
members would not only "benefit Iraq, but it would also raise grave
doubts about the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations." 44
Conversely, the representatives from the European Union and from the
African Group spoke of their desire to avoid a war as it was not
inevitable, and urged that Iraq needed the time to comply with their
"last chance" and that a war almost definitely would destroy the
"nascent industrial base and economic development" of Africa.4 5
The U.N. Members remained divided on the solution to Iraq's
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.N. Press Release SC/7687, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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noncompliance. On March 19, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq.
Then, on March 26, 2003, the United Nations held its first debate on
Iraq "since [the] hostilities began." 46 Speakers at the debate demanded a
"halt to the aggression" and an "immediate withdrawal" of U.S. forces
in Iraq.4 7 "Many stressed [how] they could not understand how the
Council could remain silent in the face of the aggression by two of its
permanent members against another United Nations Member State.A 8
In response, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated "'[w]e all want to see
this war brought to an end as soon as possible,"' and he explained that
"while it continued, it was essential that everything be done to protect
the civilian population, as well as the wounded prisoners of war, on
both sides, and to bring relief to the victims." 49
Somewhat baffled by this statement, the Iraq representative found it
"peculiar that, instead of considering the aggression itself, the Council
had been busy discussing the humanitarian aspects of the problem. [. . ]
Shouldn't the Council pay attention to the cessation of the aggression
first?"50 Consistent with Iraq's concerns, the Observer for the League of
Arab States recognized that the United States and the United Kingdom
had started a war "at a time when Iraq was positively cooperating with
United Nations inspectors," and that "[t]he only party authorized to
disarm Iraq was the [UNMOVIC]."si
In defense of U.S. and U.K. actions, Australia, who had also joined
in the military action, said "it was time for Council members to go
beyond [] acrimony, narrow political ambitions and separate agendas
which [] hamstrung the Council in recent months, and seize the
opportunity to make good on their responsibilities." 52
D. Discussion
An examination of the U.N. Charter, resolutions and press releases
suggest a persuasive argument that the United States was in violation of
its obligations under International Law and the U.N. Charter when it
invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003. In the absence of Article 51's selfdefense settings, the U.N. Charter articulates the United Nations'
decisive role in authorizing the use of military force by a Member State
against another Member State of the United Nations. However, there is
a large divide among the collective Members on the solution to Iraq's
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

U.N. Press Release SC/7705, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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non-compliance with U.N. Resolutions. It is perhaps this division, and
the fear that more waves may divide the "United" Nations beyond
repair, that is responsible for the United Nations somewhat "mum"
attitude toward the U.S. violation. What is clear is that the U.N. Security
Council declined to provide authorization in 2002 for the United States
to start the armed conflict with Iraq in which American soldiers met
their deaths.5 3
The principal cause of the U.S. violation of its obligations under
International Law and the U.N. Charter were former President Bush's
false pretenses in inducing the United States to go to war with Iraq.
These false pretenses, directed at the American people, directly caused
each step of the process of the placement of American soldiers in
harm's way and of the untimely death of too many of them in Iraq.
These deaths were the direct result of former President Bush's false
pretenses that amount to the crimes of conspiracy to commit murder and
murder. Nothing in the international law obligations of the United States
is inconsistent with such a criminal prosecution.
IV. A STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS CONSISTENT WITH
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER

While there appears to be no impediment in the international
obligations of the United States to such a prosecution, we also examine
U.S. foreign relations law. In this part, we conclude that such a
prosecution is consistent with the limitations on Presidential War
Powers. We examine below the nature and extent of the President's
powers under the Constitution and pursuant to express or implied grants
5 4 through its discussion of
of power from Congress. Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
the idea of the outer perimeter of Presidential powers, provides a useful
image of the limits on presidential power while carefully avoiding to
define those limits.5 5
In the limited context of a private civil suit, the Court has recognized
the central government's interest in preserving Presidential Absolute
Immunity (and federal official Qualified Immunity) for acts done in
office, noting:

53. Even if the United Nations was to have authorized the use of force in Iraq, former
President Bush would still be held criminally liable under the false pretenses theory, for the
U.N. authorization would be another (even lawful) act brought about by the co-conspirators in
the conspiracy to commit murder and another innocent agent or instrumentality in the charge for
murder.
54. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
55. Id. at 749-50.
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The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional
scheme. Article II, § 1, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States." This grant of authority establishes the President as the
chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted
with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion
and sensitivity. These include the enforcement of federal law -- it
is the President who is charged constitutionally to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed"; the conduct of foreign affairs -a realm in which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should
review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on
information properly held secret"; and management of the
Executive Branch -- a task for which "imperative reasons
requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the
most important of his subordinates in their most important
duties."
At the same time, there is no text in the Constitution of the United
States that prohibits the prosecution of, or expressly provides any
immunity to, the President of the United States. 57 In fact, Article I,
Section 3, Clause 7, known as the Impeachment Judgment Clause,
indicates quite the opposite. It states:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy
any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but
the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.58
This lack of any immunity for the President of the United States was
emphasized by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Paper Number 69
in the setting of an impeachment, noting that once removed from office
the President would be liable to prosecution and punishment in the
ordinary course of the law. 59 Hamilton went on to distinguish the status
of a President from that of a King and to argue that the President's
status was more comparableto that of the governor of a state.60
The President of the United States would be liable to be
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
See generally U.S. CoNST.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
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impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or
other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and
would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the
ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is
sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which
he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected
without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this
delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility,
the President of Confederated America would stand upon no
better ground than a governor of New York, and uS on worse
ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.
The Impeachment Judgment Clause permits officials, including the
President, who have been convicted of the charges for which the have
been impeached to also face civil and criminal proceedings. This
clause, however, should not be interpreted to mean that impeachment is
a precondition to the criminal prosecution of the President.
"Impeachment and criminal prosecution serve entirely distinct goals." 63
Indeed, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) concluded in a 2000
Memorandum for the Attorney General that a President may be subject
to "prosecution once . . . [his] term is over or he is otherwise removed

from office by resignation or impeachment."6 4
The idea of an outer perimeter to presidential power coupled with
the recognition of the risk of presidential criminality suggest an
underexplored but discernible dimension of our constitutional structure.
In this discernible dimension, a sitting President acting with the kind of
mens rea associated with criminality is operating outside the realm
permitted by constitutional and congressional grants of power. The
traditional structures used to analyze or punish such presidential actions
fail to grasp effectively how to address these lawless actions in anything
but a political way through impeachment.
Characterizing these actions as criminal actions by the sitting
President helps to reflect their actual character and begins to suggest the
need for a response to such lawlessness. Once such criminality by a
sitting President is imagined, the question of what is the appropriate
remedy for said criminality arises. Once the sitting President leaves
office and is a former president, then the possibility of criminal
6 1. Id.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
63.

RANDOLPH D. Moss, WHETHER A FORMER PRESIDENT MAY BE INDICTED AND TRIED

FOR THE SAME OFFENSES FOR WHICH HE WAS IMPEACHED BY THE HOUSE AND ACQUITTED BY THE

SENATE (2000), availableat http://www.justice.gov/olc/ex president.htm.
64.

RANDOLPH D. Moss, A SITTING PRESIDENT'S AMENABILITY TO INDICTMENT AND

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/sittingpresident.htm.
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prosecution as a means to provide accountability for criminal actions
done while in office becomes a more obvious feature of our
constitutional structure. As Vincent Bugliosi eloquently noted:
The notion of unbridled and absolute presidential discretion and
authority in the name of self-defense [or otherwise we would
add] is so diametrically in conflict with the antitotalitarian
principles upon which this nation was founded that it is rarely
even discussed, and when it is, there is the sense that the speaker
feels it is almost unworthy of discussion. 6 5
A. InternationalObligationsand the President
The Constitution expressly states that treaties entered into by the
United States are considered to "be the supreme [1]aw of the [1]and." 66
Article II, section 3 states that the President "shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed[.]" 67 Legal scholars have asserted that, when
read together, these clauses require the President to obey and "faithfully
execute supreme federal law whether it is customary or treaty-based."
Centuries of judicial decisions also support the proposition that the
President is bound by international obligations. 69 The earliest judicial
opinion recognizing that the president is "bound by international law" is
Ware v. Hylton.70 The Court stated that a treaty entered into by the
United States is binding "on all, as well on the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Departments[.]" 7 1
As early as 1799, Representative John Marshall-who would later
become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court-opined that the President
"was bound to execute a treaty because it is supreme federal law[.]" 72
Throughout the next century, courts continued to recognize that the
Executive was bound by international law. 73 As recently as 1984,
65.

BUGLIOSI, supra note 3, at 278

66.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

§ 3.

67.

U.S. CONST. art. II,

68.

JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 143 (1st ed.

1996).
69. Id.
70. Id.; See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
71. PAUST, supra note 68, at 144 n.7 (quoting Ware, 3 U.S. at 272).
72.

Id. at 144.

73.

Id. at 144-46. In 1800, Justice Chase stated that
[i]f the President, ... by this treaty, was bound to give this Nash up to justice,
he was so bound by the law; for the treaty is the law of the land[] . . . His
delivery was the necessary act of the [P]resident, which he was by the treaty
and the law of the land, bound to perform; .. . the [P]resident . .. [has a] duty
... [of] carrying a solemn treaty into effect.
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"Justice O'Connor also recognized that although the political branches
may terminate a treaty, power 'delegated by Congress to the Executive
Branch' as well as a relevant Congressional-executive 'arrangement'
must not be 'exercised in a manner inconsistent with . .. international
law. "74
In addition to the judicial opinions, there are legal scholars who
agree that "'the President has no plenary power to act in violation of
international law,"' and that 'no one in the executive branch has the
authority to breach customary international law."' 7 5 The President must
respect and abide by the treaties and customary international law that
bind the United States. However, opponents of this theory assert that the
President's broad authority in foreign relations is a constitutional stamp
of approval to violate whichever treaties he may choose.
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,76 the Court recognized that the
abduction of a Mexican national in Mexico by kidnappers acting at the
behest of the Drug Enforcement Agency "may have been a violation of
international law, and stated, 'Respondent . . . may be correct that [his]

abduction was shocking and that it may be in violation of general
international law principles."' 77 While agreeing with the Court's final
holding, Professor Halberstam of the Cardozo School of Law criticizes
the recognition that international law may have been violated and
United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 641-42 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800). Justice Chase affirmed the
same year that war's "extent and operations are . .. restricted . .. by thejus belli, forming a part
of the law of nations[.]" Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800). "In 1801, Chief Justice
Marshall recognized that if the President were to condemn a vessel in violation of a treaty,
which is supreme law of the land, it 'would be a direct infraction of that law, and, of
consequence, improper[.]"' Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by InternationalLaw, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 379 (1987) (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110
(1801)). The case Brown v. United States is cited as support for the theory that the Executive is
above international law as Justice Marshall stated that "usage is a guide which the sovereign
follows or abandons at his will." Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, 128 (1814). However,
the Court also recognized that usage "is not an immutable rule of law, but ... is a question
rather of policy than of law." Id. The Paquete Habana, decided in 1900, expanded further on
"usage" as customary law, and "affirmed that although congress may authorize an infraction of,
merely, the 'usage' of nations, such an infraction cannot be made 'even by direction of the
Executive, without express authority from Congress."' Jordan J. Paust, The PresidentIs Bound
by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 381 (1987) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 711 (1900)). Because the President cannot order a violation even of "usage," it seems
obvious that The PaqueteHabanaaffirms that the President is bound by international law. Id
74. PAUST, supra note 68, at 146 n.38 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984)).
75. Id. at 147 (emphasis removed).
76. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
77. Malvina Halberstam, International Kidnapping: In Defense of the Supreme Court
Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736, 737 (1992) (citing Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. at 656) (emphasis removed) (applauding the Court's decision, but criticizing the
determination that the President's action was a violation of international law).
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asserts that "under the broad powers of the Executive in the conduct of
foreign affairs," the President could order the trial of the defendant in
Alvarez regardless of whether such action violated international law.7 8
Halberstam references Curtiss-Wright in her assertion, 79 and states that
"[t]he President's authority under the Constitution to take action that
violates international law - customary or treaty - is well established."o

Halberstam further asserts that constitutionally, only the President and
Congress can decide "whether to breach U.S. obligations under
international law." 8' However, Halberstam does not address the
centuries of judicial decisions that imply that the President is bound by
international law.
B. President'sRole in InterpretingInternationalLegal Obligations
While the President is bound by international obligations, he does
play a significant, if not exclusive, role in the interpretation of
international law. The requirement that "he shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed" 82 has served as a source for this claim.
Because the primary purpose of this clause is to ensure that the
President enforces laws passed by Congress, he is required and has the
necessary power to assure that legislation involving "international
relations is carried out as the law of the land." 8 3
The President can only "make or amend treaties with[] the . . .
78. Id. at 741.
79. Id (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936)) ("[C]ongressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved.").
80. Id. at 742.
Professor Henkin stated in his General Course on Public International Law at
The Hague: "Acting for the United States, the President can denounce or
terminate a treaty, even if to do so violates international law, and if he does,
presumably it ceases to be a treaty of the United States and is no longer law of
the United States. Also, like every State, the United States has the power (not
the right) to act contrary to its treaty obligations or in violation of customary
norms, and suffer the consequences; in the United States the constitutional
authority of the President may include power to take measures related to
foreign affairs that may violate a treaty undertaking or a customary norm."
Id. (emphasis added).

81. Id at 743. Halberstam acknowledges that "Congress can, of course, enact legislation
limiting the Executive's authority." Id. at 743 n.5 1.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 206-07 (2d ed. 1996).
83. HENIGN, supra note 82, at 50.
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consent of the Senate."84 This provision has been used to argue that the
President cannot "reinterpret a treaty to mean something different from
the interpretation that was presented to the Senate and to which the
Senate gave its consent."85 In regards to whether a treaty has the effect
of domestic law, the Supreme Court has the final decision in this
*86
determination.
Most recently, the Court looked at the President's authority in
ordering state courts to give effect to an international court's decision
based on the Vienna Convention. 8 The Court recognized that while
treaties may give rise to "international commitments .

.

. they are not

domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes
or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is
ratified on these terms."88 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the
President did not have the authority to make a non-self-executing treaty
self-executing without an act of Congress. 89 Subsequently, because
Congress had not enacted legislation that gave the treaty preemption
over state law, the President's order for the Texas courts to give effect
to the International Court of Justice's decision was beyond his
authority. 90 This ruling seems to suggest that the President is not free to
interpret international law as he chooses.
C. Whether the President'sConstitutionalPowers Include the
Possibilityof Taking the Country to War UnderFalse Pretenses
1. The President's War Powers Under the Constitution
The Constitution states that the "President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States[.]" 9 1 In Federalist
Number 69, Alexander Hamilton differentiates between the President
and an absolute monarch.9 2 After discussing the absolute authority of
the King of England, Hamilton states:
84. Monroe Leigh, Is the President Above Customary International Law?, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 757, 759 (1992) (referencing U.S. Const. art. II, § 2). Obviously, the subtleties of
interpretation of Sole Executive Agreements and Congressional-Executive Agreements as
opposed to Treaties are germane but beyond the purposes of this discussion. See HENKIN, supra
note 82, at 215.
85. Leigh, supra note 84, at 759.
86. Id. at 760.
87. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (issuing a decision based on the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention).
88. Id. at 505 (internal quotations omitted).
89. Id. at 526.
90. See id. at 532.
91. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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[T]he President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be
nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in
substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of the military and
naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy;
while that of the British king extends to the declaringof war and
to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies, all which, by
the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the
legislature.93
The supreme command and direction of the military in a capacity
such as a general or admiral suggests a significant limitation on the
President's war powers. The U.S. Code describes the command
authority of combatant commanders as giving authoritative direction to
forces necessary to carry out their mission, "prescribing the chain of
command[]" to forces within that command, and organization of the
forces, among other similar duties. 94 These duties are directional and
organizational in nature and are not unlimited authority to wage war as
one sees fit. If the President's war powers are comparable, then it
becomes apparent that the Framers did not intend for there to be
unlimited, unrestricted power to make war in the office of the President.
The Federalist Papers address the concern that the President will be
an all-powerful ruler comparable to the English monarch. In Federalist
Number 67, Hamilton discusses opponents of the Constitution who
"endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in
opposition to the intended President of the United States; not merely as
the embryo, but as the full-grown progeny . . . ."95 Hamilton stresses

that while opponents try to give the intended President all of the
attributes of the English monarch, this is a false picture of the "real
nature and form" of the subject. 96
Repeatedly addressing such concerns seems to suggest that the
Framers recognized the possibility of an all-powerful, uncontrollable
President, and endeavored to allay the fears of those who thought the
Constitution would create such an entity. Because the Framers made
such significant efforts to demonstrate the differences between a
President and the all-powerful English monarch, it seems apparent that
they did not intend for the President to have unrestricted power, even in
wartime, as is specifically discussed.

93.

Id.

94.

10 U.S.C. § 164 (2009).

95.

THE FEDERALIST No. 67 (Alexander Hamilton).

96.

Id.
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2. Just Causes for War
Inherent war powers are generally based on the premise that the
President is acting for the safety of the nation and the American people.
In Federalist Number 3, John Jay considered the safety of the American
people against dangers from "foreign arms and influence" to be a first
and foremost concern. 97 However, in Federalist Number 4, Jay
recognized that the safety of Americans against dangers from foreign
forces "depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war
to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in
such a situation as not to invite hostility or insult; for it need not be
observed that there are pretended as well as just causes of war." 98
Therefore, if the President does possess inherent, unlimited power in
wartime, this seems to indicate it is only for the safety of the American
people in a "just" war. Jay does not expand on what powers the
President would have in the case of a just or an unjust war.
D. Curtiss-Wright and the Youngstown Trilogy
1. Curtiss-Wright
Curtiss-Wright9 9 has greatly influenced the theory of the President as
the "sole organ" in decisions involving foreign affairs.' The Court
held that Congress may delegate broad foreign affairs authority to the
President, but dicta indicated that the President could claim autonomy in
foreign affairs absent any delegation from Congress.101 This broad
source of power does not depend on "affirmative grants of power" from
the Constitution but rather was given to the President before the
Constitution was adopted, and therefore, the President has exclusive
power "as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress[.]"' 02
The opinion in Curtiss-Wright included a reference to a speech given
by John Marshall before the U.S. House of Representatives, referring to
the President as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations."1 03 Legal scholars have
97.
98.

THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay) (emphasis removed).
THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay).

99. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
100. See Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The "Sole Organ"
Doctrine, I PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 139-52 (2007), available at http://www.loc.gov/law/
help/usconlaw/pdf/SoleOrgan-MarchO7.pdf
101. Seeidat148.
102. Id. (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20).
103. Id. at 140.
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theorized that the speech does not give the President such broad foreign
affairs power if read in the proper context. Before Marshall became
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, he wrote an article' 04 where he
described that the president was the "channel for communicating with
other nations."105 Thus, if the speech in which Marshall made the
famous "sole organ" comment is read in full, it becomes apparent that
the President, as the sole organ in foreign affairs, is limited to execution
of laws passed by Congress." In relevant part, the speech instructs that:
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Of
consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made
on him. He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and
directs the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be
performed by the force of the nation is to be performed through
him. He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be
a law. He must then execute a treaty, where he, and he alone,
possesses the

means

of executing it.

.

.

. Congress,

unquestionably, may prescribe the mode ... [A]nd Congress may
devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till
this be done, it seems the duty of the executive department to
execute the contract by any means it possesses.'o0
Scholars suggest that Marshall's purpose when describing the
President "as the sole organ 'was simply the President's role as an
instrument of communication with other governments.',, 107 Marshall's
subsequent rulings as Chief Justice indicated that he believed that
Congress was the branch that possessed the power to make war. In Little
v. Barreme, Marshall ruled that, "when a presidential proclamation
issued in time of war conflicts with a statute enacted by Congress, the
statute prevails." 08 When Marshall's writings and relevant judicial
opinions are contrasted with the context of the opinion in CurtissWright, it seems less likely that the case stands for broad and
unrestricted presidential war power.

104. Id. at 141.
105. Id. ("[O]n matters of extradition, nationals communicate with each other 'through the
channel of their governments[.]"').
106. Id. at 141-42 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 142.
108. Id. at 143 (quoting Little v. Barreme, 2 Cr. (6 U.S.) 170, 179 (1804)).
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2. The Youngstown Trilogy
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,109 also known as the Steel
Seizure case, stands in contrast to Curtiss-Wright in regards to unlimited
presidential power during wartime. Justice Black held that the
President's power must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself.no However, it is Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion that has been most often used in looking at the limits on the
President's war powers.'' Known as the Youngstown trilogy, Jackson
outlined three categories where the President's powers may be
challenged.112 The first category applies "[w]hen the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con ress[.]"ll 3 The
President's authority is at its greatest in this category. 14 The second
category is "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority" and "there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority[.]"" 5
The third category applies "[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress" relying
"only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress . . . ."ll6
3. The Youngstown Trilogy following Medellin
Medellin v. Texas is a 2008 case applying the Youngstown trilogy.117
Medellin, who was tried and convicted of murder in a Texas court, was
one of 51 Mexican nationals named in "a claim brought by Mexico
against the United States."" 8 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
considered the claim and held that "based on violations of the Vienna
Convention, . . . [the]

nationals were entitled to review

and

reconsideration of their state-court convictions and sentences in the
United States."ll 9 The Supreme Court issued an opinion involving an
109. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
110. Id. at 587-89.
111. Id. at 634-61.
112. Id. at 635-38.
113. Id. at 635.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 637.
116. Id.
117. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). See also Michael J. Turner, Fade to Black:
The FormalizationofJackson's Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellin, 58 Am. U.L.
REv. 665, 668 (2009).
118. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497.
119. Id. at 497-98 (citing Case ConcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
United States), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31)).
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unrelated claiml 20 that followed the ICJ's holding that "contrary to the
ICJ's determination, the Vienna Convention did not preclude the
application of state default rules." 12 1
However, in connection with the ICJ's ruling, President George W.
Bush issued a Memorandum to the Attorney General stating that "the
United States would 'discharge its international obligations' under
22
Avena 'by having the State courts give effect to the [ICJ] decision."'l
The government argued that the President had the authority to settle
international disputes through his broad discretion in foreign affairs. 123
Chief Justice Roberts applied the "zone of twilight" analysis to "h[o]ld
that this 'independent source of authority' does not support the
President's actions in this case."1 24 In order for the Memorandum to fall
within the "zone of twilight," there must be a long history of
congressional acquiescence in this area. Chief Justice Roberts states that
the cases the government relies on "involve a narrow set of
circumstances[.]"
Albeit in a 2010 Student Note, Michael J. Turner interestingly argues
that this holding
effectively eliminat[es] the "zone of twilight" [b]y requiring a
"systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned," [as] the
Court is essentially extending the first category-executive
action with the express or implied authorization of Congress-to
cover the middle "zone of twilight."1 26
Another case that has implications for the Youngstown trilogy is
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.127 In holding that "military commissions [for]
trying enemy combatants violated federal and international law[,] [a]
120. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
121. Medellin, 522 U.S. at 498.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 523-24. The government relied on the "claims settlement" cases. Id. at 530-31
(citing Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229; United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 330 (1937)).
124. Turner, supra note 117, at 688 (quoting Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531). Turner argues
that this suggests that "in order to enable executive action in the 'zone of twilight,' as the claims
settlement cases did, the action would have to be 'supported by a particularly longstanding
practice' of congressional acquiescence,"' or in other words, "[i]n order to fall within the 'zone
of twilight,' the President must show a 'systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned."' Id. at 689-90 (quoting
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531).
125. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531.
126. Turner, supra note 117, at 669.
127. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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majority of the Court held that the ... commissions were unlawful
because their 'structure and procedures violate both the Uniform Code
of Military Justice ("UCMJ") and the Geneva Conventions . . . .128
Justice Stevens stated, "'the President . .. may not disregard limitations

that Congress .. . has placed on his powers[.]"' 1 29 Turner asserts that
Justice Stevens' cite to Youngstown indicates an "assum[ption] that
Jackson himself viewed the third category as a 'disabling zone' where
Congress necessarily wins, which is by no means apparent[,]"l 30 and the
application of Jackson's taxonomy in Hamdan indicates "that where
Congress and the President disagree, Congress always wins, except
perhaps where the President can find a textual grant of power in the
Constitution."13 1
Turner puts forth the idea that Jackson's three categories have been
changed by the opinions in Medellin and Hamdan. In future cases
involving Presidential action, the analysis could be "[w]hen the
President acts with the express or implied authorization of Congress including the implied blessing of a 'particularly longstanding practice'
of congressional acquiescence - his power is at its maximum;
otherwise, he cannot act unless he can point to a textual source of power
in the Constitution."' 32 Combined with the conclusion that CurtissWright is based on a limited reading of John Marshall's speech to the
House of Representatives, and the potential effect on Youngstown by the
Medellin and Hamdan opinions, there seems to be an implication of
considerable limitations on presidential war power than has been
asserted by many in the Executive office.
While these debates about Presidential War Power will no doubt
continue,' 33 for current purposes, the heart of the argument we are
making is that the Presidential War Power does not include the ability to
take the country to war in Iraq on the basis of false pretenses that
amount to a conspiracy to commit murder and murder. The robust
version of that argument would be that the typical Curtiss-Wright or
Youngstown type analysis is inapposite, as the President acting in such a
128. Turner, supra note 117, at 681.
129. Id. at 682 (quoting Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23) (citing to Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 690. Cf Ingrid Wuerth, Medellin: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 1 (2009) (taking issue with the Court's use of Youngstown in the treaty setting).
133. See Benjamin G. Davis, Obama andLibya, 7 FLA. A & M L. REV. (forthcoming Fall
2012) (discussing the current debate about presidential and congressional roles under the War
Powers Resolution with regard to Libya). An excellent discussion on Libya and Presidential
War Powers is summarized at Benjamin Wittes, Peter Margulies Reports on AALS III,
LAWFARE, Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/01/peter-margulies-reports-on-aalsiii/.
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manner is acting outside of his or her authority in any event in our
constitutional structure.
V. A STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS
CONSISTENT WITH COMPLEMENTARITY

In this part, we examine whether such a prosecution is consistent
with complementarity1 34 by comparing the prospects for such a
prosecution in various fora. We conclude that while there are hurdles,
state criminal prosecution may be the best available approach to assure
accountability.
A. Internationalor Foreign Tribunals

The pre-conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the
International Criminal Court would be difficult to achieve due to the: 1)
lack of a referral of a State party, 2) lack of a referral by the U.N.
Security Council, and 3) lack of will of the prosecutor to initiate such a
prosecution. 135 With regard to the lack of a referral of a State party, it is
assumed that the United States, through a sitting President, would bring
to bear its political, military and diplomatic pressure against any state
with the "temerity" to make such a referral, particularly if the United
States had signed an Article 98 agreement with that state. 36 With regard
to a lack of a referral by the U.N. Security Council, as a permanent
member, the United States would likely block the effort with a
threatened veto or actual veto of such an attempted referral. With regard
to the lack of will of the ICC prosecutor to initiate such a prosecution,
similar political, military and diplomatic pressure would be brought to
bear on the ICC prosecutor as would be against a state, including
possible reference to the American Service-Members Protection Act, to
dissuade such an action.1 37
134. For a recent discussion of Complementarity, see Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence Based
Theory of Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming Winter 2012).
135.

ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT pt. 2, art. 12, U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.183/9 (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF75752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/ RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf.
136. Id. pt. 9, art. 98. The United States aggressively sought to sign Bilateral Immunity
Agreements (Article 98 Agreements) with other states to prevent the International Criminal
Court from proceeding against U.S. personnel present in such country. See David A. Tallman,
Note, Catch 98(2): Article 98 Agreements and the Dilemma of Treaty Conflict, 92 GEO. L.J.
1033 (2004); Chet J. Tan, Jr., The ProhferationofBilateralNon-SurrenderAgreements Among
Non-Ratifiers of the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
1115 (2004); David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's OriginalIntent, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 333 (2005).

137.

American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C.
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As to a foreign tribunal, as has been demonstrated in the numerous
efforts to initiate prosecutions of American officials for alleged torture
since September 11th, the United States would be relentless in asserting
its right to undertake such prosecutions exclusively in U.S. domestic
fora under the principle of complementarity (offensive assertion of
complementarity). Even if such an investigation and prosecution were
initiated, the experience with the Italian torture case suggests that the
United States would not make available the former President and, at
most and only if permitted under the local law, a trial in absentia would
be possible.'
Even if such a trial went forward, because it would be a foreign court
and not a U.S. domestic court, the United States would not likely waive
any immunity ratione materiae that could be asserted for the former
U.S. President, raising a significant hurdle to the success of such a
case. 140 Even if convicted in absentia and a sentence pronounced, it is

Some people have tried to get the International Criminal Court to act on renditions, to no avail
so far. See Brian Dolinar, ICC Complaint Filed Against Bush, Cheney, et al. by UIUC Prof
Francis Boyle and Lawyers Against the War, URBANA CHAMPAIGN INDEPENDENT MEDIA

CENTER (Jan. 21, 2010), http://ucimc.org/content/icc-complaint-filed-against-bush-cheney-et-aluiuc-prof-francis-boyle-and-lawyers-against-wa. Moreover, the former ICC prosecutor has
publicly demonstrated a reluctance to initiate any investigation related to the War in Iraq or
Afghanistan. See Office of the Prosecutor, Response to Communications Received Concerning
Iraq, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int

(search "Response to Communications Received Concerning Iraq") ("Taking into account all
the considerations, the situation did not appear to meet the required threshold of the Statute.").
Since 2007, requests for information have been made to the Afghan government with no
response. Afghanistan, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/

Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+RefAfghanistan/
(last visited
Mar. 5, 2012).
138. See Letter of the U.S. Department of Justice to the Spanish Court with regard to the
Request for Assistance from Spain in the Matter of David Addington; Jay Bybee et al. (Mar. 1,
2011) (Spanish Ref. No. 0002342/2009-CAP), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/US%20
Letters%20RogatoryA20Response%2OMarch%201,%202011 %20-%20ENG.pdf; Sarah Posner,
Spain Court Turns Over Guantanamo Torture Investigation to US, JURIST (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/spain-court-turns-over-guantanamo-torture-investigation-toUS.php.
139. CIA agents guilty ofItaly kidnap, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/8343123.stm ("The Americans were all tried in their absence as they have not been extradited
from the US to Italy.").
140. See the discussion of the Bashir indictment at Julian Ku, African Union May Ask ICJ
for Opinion on Bashir's Immunity from ICC, OPINIOJURIS.ORG, Feb. 1, 2012,
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/02/01/african-union-may-ask-icj-for-opinion-on-bashir/e2%80%99
s-immunity-from-icc/; Dapo Akande, ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir's Immunity
( . .At long Last ... ) But Gets the Law Wrong, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.ejil
talk.orglicc-issues-detailed-decision-on-bashir/oE2%80%99s-immunity-at-long-last-but-getsthe-law-wrong/; Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J.
121 (Feb. 14).
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doubtful that the former U.S. President would serve a day. Even if such
a decision would be of symbolic importance overseas, it is doubtful that
it would have the desired expressive effect in the United States because
of the suspicion of the foreign (and international) tribunal process.
B. PoliticalAccountability or CriminalAccountability at the Federal
Level in the UnitedStates
In contrast to proceedings before an international or foreign tribunal,
complementarity provides a further path for that accountability in the
United States. In the post-World War II period, 14 1 the American vision
of accountability included the idea of a federal official being held
politically accountable through pressure to decline to seek reelection, 14 2
resigning in disgrace,' 43 not being reelected, 144 or being tried if not
impeached.145 As to criminal accountability, there is significant
resistance to criminal prosecution of high-level federal officials (though
it can occur), 14 6 let alone a former U.S. President.
None of the electoral methods for political accountability (pressure
Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent
or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal
prosecution in certain circumstances. First, such persons enjoy no criminal
immunity under international law in their own countries, and may thus be tried
by those countries' courts in accordance with the relevant rule of domestic law.
Id.
141. For an excellent historical analysis discussing the censure by the House of President
Polk over the Mexican-American War in mid-nineteenth century, see Fisher, supra note 10, at
173-74.

142. President Lyndon B. Johnson in relation to the Vietnam War.
143. President Richard M. Nixon with respect to Watergate.
144. President James Carter or President George H.W. Bush.
145. President William J. Clinton.
146. See Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of CriminalProsecution in
U.S. Domestic Courts of High-Level US. Civilian Authority and Military Generalsfor Torture
and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 503, 545-68

(2008). "A fourth lesson is to highlight misfeasance of the general staff through which nonjudicial punishment as discipline appears more appropriate rather than malfeasance where a
criminal prosecution might be seen as more appropriate." Id. at 557. President Gerald Ford's
pardon of former President Richard Nixon is another paradigm of the cultural resistance to such
a prosecution. The resistance to criminal prosecution of high-level civilians for torture by both
the Bush and Obama Administration has led to ever more insistent private citizen "calls to
action." See COLLEEN COSTELLO, INDEFENSIBLE: A REFERENCE FOR PROSECUTING TORTURE AND
OTHER FELONIES COMMITTED BY U.S. OFFICIALS FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER I ITH (C. Costello et al.

eds., 2012). But such federal prosecution can happen, as in the case of Edwin "Scooter" Libby,
though the sentence was commuted by former President Bush. Bush Commutes Libby's Prison
Term in CIA Leak Case (Update 5), July 2, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid a2WQ_iYK.XEI.
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to decline to seek reelection, resigning in disgrace, and not being
reelected) are relevant as former President George W. Bush has no
interest in a further political career. Impeachment of a former President
is theoretically possible in our constitutional structure but very
difficult. 14 7 Further, a successful impeachment would carry with it only
the modest potential sanction of barring a former President from future
federal service.
Under complementarity, in contrast to the political approach,
domestic criminal prosecution is a further avenue for accountability.
Such a criminal prosecution might typically be examined in terms of a
federal criminal prosecution, as has occurred for some then-current or
former federal officials. For a former President, however, a federal
criminal prosecution is unlikely given the lack of political or
institutional will of any sitting President to sit in judgment of any
former President (most recently expressed in the pardon by President
Gerald Ford of former President Richard Nixon who resigned in

disgrace). 14 8
147. Please note that there appears to be one continuing possibility of the status of a
former President (and any other official for that matter) that is under-examined, which is his
impeachment after leaving office (by resignation or otherwise). The language of the
Impeachment Clause states that
[j]udgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
from Office, and disqualficationto hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust
or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added). The 1797 impeachment trial of Senator William
Blount, who had fled, and the 1876 impeachment trial of Secretary of War William Belknap
after his resignation demonstrate that the House and Senate have acted upon cases such as these
to vindicate the disqualification-for-future-office prong of the Impeachment Clause. See
ELEANOR BUSHNELL, CRIMES FOLLIES AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS

24-41, 164-89 (1992); IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIAL AND ERRORS 160-61 (1972). The

former President might be subject to impeachment for acts done while in office with the
subsequent sanction of "disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States" in any future administration. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. The power
appears to be there, and the question is whether the House and Senate still seek to exercise that
power. See The Senate's Impeachment Role, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Senate Impeachment Role.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
148. Judicial willingness to countenance criminal prosecution of a former President for
acts done during his term of office, and its impact on the Presidency as a coequal branch is
another set of tensions that remain in the backdrop to this prosecution. On the one hand,
President Ford's pardon of former President Nixon after the latter resigned was an
acknowledgement by a sitting President of a former President's criminal liability for acts done
during his term of office. In relevant part, President Ford's pardon of former President Nixon
includes the following language:
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In sum, whether international or foreign tribunals, domestic political
accountability or federal criminal prosecution, the prospects for such
approaches appear limited. We shall now examine the unexplored and
less obvious avenue for accountability through complementarity in
American federalism in the state criminal prosecution of a former
President.

VI. THE STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND

DEFENSES

For purposes of the Research Report on which this Article is based,
we examined the laws of California with the hope that the approach will
provide a useful template for the analysis in other states. For purposes
of the analysis, we focus on the jurisdiction of the California state courts
over conspiracy to commit murder and murder under the false pretenses
theory, and we highlight the defenses that might be expected to be
presented by a former President.
A. Jurisdiction
1. Conspiracy to Commit Murder
A California court will likely have jurisdiction over former President
Bush for conspiracy to commit murder so long as he or one of his coconspirators committed an overt act in California in furtherance of a
conspiracy.149 The two overt acts (perhaps among others to be
discovered) that Bush committed in California in furtherance of the
As a result of certain acts or omissions occurring before his resignation from
the Office of President, Richard Nixon has become liable to possible indictment
and trial for offenses against the United States. Whether or not he shall be so
prosecuted depends on findings of the appropriate grand jury and on the
discretion of the authorized prosecutor. Should an indictment ensue, the
accused shall then be entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury, as guaranteed
to every individual by the Constitution.
Proclamation No. 4311 (Sept. 8, 1974), available at http://www.watergate.info/ford/pardonproclamation.shtml. On the other hand, as has occurred with state criminal prosecutions of other
former federal officials, the judiciary has developed doctrines discussed in Part VI, which may
come into play with regard to a former President and other former federal officials.
149. California Penal Code Section 182 states that "[i]f two or more persons conspire . . .
[t]o commit any crime," the case "may be prosecuted and tried in the superior court of any
county in which any overt act tending to effect the conspiracy shall be done." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 182(a) (West 2012). Section 184 states that "[n]o agreement amounts to a conspiracy, unless
some act, beside such agreement, be done within this state to effect the object thereof, by one or
more of the parties to such agreement and the trial . . . may be had in any county in which any
such act be done." CAL. PENAL CODE
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conspiracy to commit murder arise from the facts that (1) he addressed
the nation, and his false pretenses for going to war were televised across
the country, including in California, and (2) there was active military
recruiting across the nation, including in California. A state prosecution
for conspiracy in California of someone who was outside of California
would be proper under California law as long as an overt act to affect
the object of the conspiracy by a co-conspirator occurs in California
within three years before the indictment in a non-capital case or at any
time in a capital case. 150
The range of evidence that is admissible on a charge of conspiracy is
very broad: virtually any act in furtherance of the conspiracy would
satisfy the overt act requirement. 15 Members of the conspiracy are
bound by all acts of all other members that were committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy-acts that follow as a probable and
natural consequence of a common design, even where those acts were
not intended as part of the original design or common plan. 15 2 Such
overt acts need not be criminal in nature, so long as they are done in
pursuit of the conspiracy. 153
As to evidence physically outside the state, "[a] telephone call into a
forum [] originating from outside [] it, made in furtherance of a criminal
conspiracy, is a sufficient overt act" under Penal Code Section 182, "for
purposes of establishing venue over a conspiracy prosecution in the
forum county." 54 Evidence from another jurisdiction is admissible to
show the object of the conspiracy.
In sum, these precedents on evidence outside of California being
admissible, operating from outside of California through intermediaries
into California, and operating even over the internet or telephone lines
not defeating jurisdiction of the California courts are favorable to a
prosecution. When one adds to this vision the requirement of only one
overt act (that may be lawful) of a co-conspirator in a context where the
conspiracy could be seen as a "wheel" conspiracy (with former
President Bush and other former officials at the hub) or "chain"
conspiracy (with former President Bush at or near the beginning of the
chain of conspirators), the likelihood of jurisdiction in California being
150.

17 CAL. JUR. 3D (Rev.) pt. 1, Supp. Crim. Law: Responsibility for Acts of

Coconspirators § 146, at 101 (2012) (citing People v. Superior Court (Quinteros), 13 Cal. App.
4th 12 (1993)); People v. Lowery, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1207 (1998)). See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 182, 799 which read together make the statute of limitations of the underlying offense (here
first degree murder which has no statute of limitations in California) apply also to the
conspiracy to murder charge.
151.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 663 (5th ed. 2010).

152.
153.
154.
155.

19 CAL. JUR. 3D Crim. Law: Miscellaneous Offenses
Id. § 77.
Id. § 104.
Id. § 126.
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proper is a virtual certainty.
2. Murder
As to the charge of murder, there have been cases in other
jurisdictions where state proceedings (as opposed to federal
proceedings) went forward, where the conduct adversely affecting the
state took place within the territorial jurisdiction of even another
country or the high seas, and where the state's jurisdiction was
considered proper. 56 There have also been cases where the
premeditation to commit murder is formed in one state, but the murder
itself takes place in another.'5 7 These cases would suggest that U.S.
CONST. Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 of the Constitution and 18 U.S.C. Sec.
3238 would not necessarily be an impediment to such a prosecution.
We have researched U.S. CONST. Art. III, Sec. 2 and found an oblique
reference to it with regard to murder in the case of Reid v. Covert, but
the issues in that case appear inapposite to the discussion at hand. 159
Of more relevance is Heath v. Alabama.160 With regard to the claim
of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court, citing the uniform line of its
cases with regard to the dual sovereign doctrine stated that: "States are
separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because
each State's power to prosecute is derived from its own 'inherent
sovereignty,' not from the Federal Government."' 6 ' The Court further
emphasized the nature of this state sovereignty:
[E]ach government in determining what shall be an offence
against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty,
not that of the other. . . . It follows that an act denounced as a

crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense
against the peace and dignity of both, and may be punished by
156. California Penal Code Section 187(a) defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a
human being . . . with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE

§

187(a) (West 2012). Malice

may be express or implied. Id. § 188. Malice is considered "express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart." Id.; BUGLIOSI, supra note 3, at 309-10 (citing Strassheim v.
Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1910); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73, 76 (1941); State v.
Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 534-35, 554-56 (1976); State v. Jack, 125 P.3d 311, 318-22 (2005)).
157. BUGLIOSI, supra note 3, at 311 (citing Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1980) and
other cases).
158. Id. at 309.
159. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that a spouse who is charged with murder
of an on-duty soldier in the United Kingdom is entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding the U.S.U.K. Status of Forces Agreement).
160. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
161. Id. at 89 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 n.14 (1978)).
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each.
The States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than
they are with respect to the Federal Government. Their powers to
undertake criminal prosecution derive from separate and
independent sources of power and authority originally belonging
to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them by
the Tenth Amendment.' 62
Each state's legislature determines the extent of its exercise of its
sovereign power in this realm. Thus, it is necessary to determine
whether a given state's legislation as interpreted by its courts has
prescribed that, in exercising its sovereignty, the state's murder statute
may reach these types of acts, with some acts in the state and the murder
outside the state.
In this regard, California Penal Code Section 27 defines persons
"liable to punishment under the laws of this state" to include "[a]ll
persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state,"
as well as "[a]ll who, being without this state, cause or aid, advise or
encourage, another person to commit a crime within this state, and are
afterwards found therein."' 6 3 Thus, California's approach to its
sovereignty is consistent with an assertion of jurisdiction over crimes
that occurred outside the state where California's interests are the
strongest (California citizens or residents murdered outside of
California), and where sufficient evidence of the preparatory acts in
California can be provided.
A further issue to be determined is whether the application of the
state criminal laws in this manner is a logical extension of the state's
police powers. It would appear necessary to establish a sufficient nexus
with the state for the relevant defendants, though following Skiriotes as
analyzed in Bundrant,164 state citizenship is not a prerequisite for such a
prosecution. The Bundrant court does note in dicta that certain
principles of international law form part of the bases for the assertion of
jurisdiction.' 6 5 Of the typical bases for a state's jurisdiction to prescribe,
the principal bases for jurisdiction appear to be (at least partially) the
effects doctrine basis in territorial jurisdiction in Bundrant and the
nationality principle (citizen of Florida) in Skiriotes.166 We note that
both of these principles are recognized in international law, but that
principles such as the passive personality (nationality of the victim162. Id. (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
163. CAL. PENAL CODE § 27 (West 2012).
164. State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 554-56 (Alaska 1976).
165. See id. at 548-55.
166. Id.
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i.e., California citizens killed in Iraq), the protective principle
(protection of a state's interest), and the universality principle (proper
jurisdiction for certain international crimes in all courts) 167 may be of
relevance to the analysis.
Though their focus is described in terms of the state's interest, the
effects doctrine cases appear to also be consistent with the passive
personality and protective principles well recognized in international
law. The argument in favor of California jurisdiction is comforted, in
federal law, in the case of United States v. Benitez, in which crimes
committed in Colombia were properly seen as subject to the jurisdiction
of the federal district court for the Southern District of Florida, as these
crimes had a potentially adverse effect upon the security or
governmental functions of the United States. 168 Former President
Bush's conspiring entirely in the United States has an even stronger tie
to a California court than the Benitez conspiring in Colombia had to a
Florida court.
As to the murder of Americans in Iraq (i.e., outside the State of
California), the relevant applicable doctrine would be the "innocent
agent" or "innocent instrumentality" doctrine.1 69 The essence of that
doctrine can be described as follows:

167. Professor Jordan Paust has noted that state courts have prosecuted international
crimes over which there is universal jurisdiction when the criminal conduct took place within
the state. See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 113, 115 (Pa. 0. & T.
1784). State courts have also allowed civil claims for international crimes over which there is
universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Christian County Court v. Rankin & Tharp, 63 Ky. 502, 505-06
(1866); Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History
and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 618-20
(1989), reprintedand revised in JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 226-27 (2d ed. 2003). One state court prosecution for murder using international legal
standards occurred in the nineteenth century. See Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms,
Myths, and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 116 n.60 (1972). In addition, numerous
state court decisions have recognized that states are bound by customary international law. See,
e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION INTHE U.S. 579-81 (3d ed.,
2009), and cases cited therein; Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the
Founders,Framers,and Early JudiciaryConcerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law
ofNations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 205, 245-50 (2008). It follows logically that state
courts also have a retained competence under customary international law known as universal
jurisdiction. Importantly also, states are bound by treaty law of the United States. See, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority,
31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 301, 315, 320-24 (2008), and cases cited therein;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§

111 (1987).

168. United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984).
169. It is beyond the scope of this Article to make a detailed presentation of this doctrine.
Rather, it is presented as a means to see how American deaths in Iraq can be addressed in this
murder charge. See BUGLIOSI, supra note 3, at 87-88, 271-72; Benjamin G. Davis et al., supra
note 5.
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We thus conclude that when a person, with the mental state
necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to
kill, that person's guilt is determined by the combined acts of all
the participants as well as that person's own mens rea. If that
person's mens rea is more culpable than another's, that person's
guilt may be eater even if the other might be deemed the actual
perpetrator.
It may also be summarized in the following manner:
In [... .], the court analyzed the responsibility of the criminal for a
killing committed by the victim or a police officer as follows:
When the defendant or his accomplice, with a conscious
disregard for life, intentionally commits an act that is likely to
cause death, and his victim or a police officer kills in reasonable
response to such act, the defendant is guilty of murder. In such a
case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a
felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his
accomplice committed with conscious disregard for life.
Thus, the victim's self-defensive killing or the police officer's
killing in the performance of his duty cannot be considered an
independent intervening cause for which the defendant is not
liable, for it is a reasonable response to the dilemma thrust upon
the victim or the policeman by the intentional act of the
defendant or his accomplice. 17 1
Thus, where there is "actus reus," but lesser or no "mens rea" in the
agent or instrumentality, the person doing the killing may be the
innocent agent or innocent instrumentality of the perpetrator. The
murders that led to the California criminal case are the deaths of the
American soldiers at the hands of Iraqis who are considered "innocent
agents" of former President Bush.
B. Removal
In our system of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction, the
federalism tensions described in the initial part come to the fore in the
setting of a state proceeding in a state court against a federal official.
170. People v. McCoy, 24 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Cal. 2001).
171. People v. Williams, 75 Cal. App. 3d 731, 747 (1977) (quoting People v. Gilbert, 63
Cal. 2d 690, 704-05 (1965)) (internal quote marks removed). See also People v. Antick, 15 Cal.
3d 79, 87-88 (1975); Williams, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 746-47 (1977) (citing Taylor v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 583-84 (1970)).
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This issue has been the subject of analysis by the courts back to the
early nineteenth century. Currently, the principal statute for resolving
such issues is the federal officer removal statute, which in part provides
that:
A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a
State court ... against . .. any of the following [persons] may be

removed by them to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) . . . [a]ny officer (or person acting under that officer) of the
United States or any agency thereof, . . . for . . . any act under

color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority
claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or
punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.172
1. Procedural Overview
In order to better situate the practicalities of such a removal, it is
important to provide an overview of the process of such a removal.
Once state criminal charges would be filed, like other present or former
federal officials, former President Bush would likely seek removal of
the matter from the state court to the federal district court embracing the
place where the charges were pending.
2. Relevant Factors for Removal
The statute indicates, and courts have determined, that three factors
must be met before federal officers may remove to federal courts. 173
First, the defendant must demonstrate that he is a federal officer or
acting under one. 174 Second, the officer must show that he was working
under the color of his authority at the moment the state crime was
committed. 17 5 This means that there must be a causal connection
between the action done under authority and the state prosecution.176
Last, the defendant must raise a colorable federal defense to his
actions.' 7 7 If all three factors are met, a request for removal will be
granted.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), (a)(1) (2012).
173. See Winters v. Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 397 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
174. Winters, 149 F.3d at 397.
17 5. Id.
176. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926).
177. Winters, 149 F.3d at 397.
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Former President Bush meets the requirement that he be a federal
officer, and he will certainly raise several federal defenses to his
actions.178 The only factor that may possibly hinder his ability to
remove to the federal courts is if his actions were not done under the
color of his authority as the President of the United States. Thus, to
avoid such removal of the state criminal prosecution to federal court, it
would appear necessary for the prosecutor to argue persuasively that
former President Bush's action were not done under the color of his
authority as the President of the United States. This "color of office"
analysis in the removal setting should not be viewed in the same manner
as an assertion of immunity, such as Supremacy Clause Immunity. In
Willingham v. Morgan,'7 9 the Supreme Court held that, "the test for
removal should be broader, not narrower, than the test for official
immunity." 80 In disagreeing with the court below, the Supreme Court
stated:
The position of the court below would have the anomalous result
of allowing removal only when the officers had a clearly
sustainable defense. The suit would be removed only to be
dismissed. Congress certainly meant more than this when it chose
the words "under color of . .. office." In fact, one of the most

important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the
defense of official immunity tried in a federal court. The officer
need not win his case before he can have it removed. In cases like
this one, Congress has decided that federal officers, and indeed
the Federal Government itself, require the protection of a federal
forum. This policy should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging
interpretation of [§] 1442(a)(1).' 8 '
At the same time, in dicta distinguishing the type of showing
required for removal in a criminal case as compared to civil cases, the
Supreme Court in Willingham noted at footnote 4: "Were this a criminal
case, a more detailed showing might be necessary because of the more
compelling state interest in conducting criminal trials in the state
courts."
The Willingham case would suggest that, for a given federal official
seeking removal to federal court of a state criminal case, the sufficiency
of the showing that the federal official would have to make ("a short
178. See infra Part VI.D.
179. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969).
180. Id. at 405.
181. Id. at 406-07.
182. Id. at 409 n.4 (citing Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 518-21 (1932); Maryland v.
Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 35 (1926)).
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and plain statement")183 might not be to actually provide a sustainable
defense, but still has to be more than a summary statement. At the same
time, given the state criminal prosecution is of a former U.S. President
and his powers and role under the Constitution, the Court's concern
about protecting the federal interests in such a case through providing a
federal forum may be particularly acute. These concerns may influence
the district court's evaluation under its discretion of any statement made
by a former President seeking removal.184
It should be highlighted that during the pendency of the federal court
removal proceeding, the state court proceedings may o forward, except
Thus, the state
as to the rendering of a verdict before remand.'
prosecutor should be prepared to proceed forward in the state case while
at the same time arguing against the removal motion in the federal
district court.
Assuming that removal has been granted, the next question that
would arise is the disposition of the case in the federal court. The case
could be dismissed on a Rule 12(b) type motion early in the federal
court proceeding, or it could go all the way through trial to a verdict.186
C. Requestfor Dismissal
Courts have applied a range of reasoning that result in the protection
of federal officers from criminal prosecution: the defendant's actions
being honest and reasonable,' 8 7 the defendant's conduct being necessary
and proper under the circumstances,s and/or the defendant being on
183.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2011).

184. For example, the discretion of the district court is apparent in its discussion of what
should be presented as grounds for removal, to wit:
A notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall include all grounds for such
removal. A failure to state grounds which exist at the time of the filing of the
notice shall constitute a waiver of such grounds, and a second notice may be
filed only on grounds not existing at the time of the original notice. For good
cause shown, the United States district court may grant relief from the
limitations of this paragraph.
Id. § 1446 (c)(2).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3) ("The filing of a notice of removal of a criminal prosecution
shall not prevent the State court in which such prosecution is pending from proceeding further,
except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless the prosecution is first
remanded.").
186. See, e.g., California v. H & H Ship Serv. Co., No. 94-10182, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
30986 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 1995).
187. Idaho v. Horiuchi, 214 F.3d 986, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot 266 F.3d
979 (9th Cir. 2001).
188. Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722, 728-30 (9th Cir. 1977).
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active duty and merely making simple errors in judgment.189 None of
these types of reasoning on their face, would apply to a President
knowingly taking the nation to war under false pretenses. Most of these
cases involved FBI, Drug Agents and Military Personnel, among others.
These cases are dismissed when defense counsels file 12(b) motionsthe preferred vehicle by which to assert the defense of immunity under
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
After the indictment (i.e., after the grand jury proceedings), the
defendant might move to dismiss the indictment and seek petitions in
the state appellate courts for a writ of prohibition.1 90 Another form of
intervention would be a federal court injunction of the state court
criminal proceeding, sometimes referred to as a Younger-type action. In
Younger v. Harris,the Supreme Court held that:
For these reasons, fundamental not only to our federal system but
also to the basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National
Government under our Constitution, we hold that the
Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having upset the
settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the
availability of injunctive relief against state criminal
prosecutions. We do not think that opinion stands for the
proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement
of a statute solely on the basis of a showing that the statute "on its
face" abridges First Amendment rights. There may, of course, be
extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable
injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual
prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. For example, as long
ago as the Buck case, supra, we indicated:
"It is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it."
Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might
also arise, but there is no point in our attempting now to specify
what they might be. It is sufficient for purposes of the present
case to hold, as we do, that the possible unconstitutionality of a
statute on its face does not in itself justify an injunction against
good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that appellee Harris has
failed to make any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other
189. Maryland v. DeShields, No. 86-5180, 1987 WL 38619, at *7 (4th Cir. Sept. 25, 1987)
(unpublished opinion).
190. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief 191
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court discussed at length the
policy and legal concerns underpinning the decision. A key component
of the analysis was the "basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that
courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to
restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable

relief."' 92
Therefore, under Younger, cases where the state criminal prosecution
involves 1) bad faith or harassment, 2) patent and flagrant
unconstitutionality or 3) other extraordinary circumstancesl 93 have
appeared to be the ones where federal courts might examine the
question of injunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief. It should be
highlighted that Younger carefully leaves open the possibility that some
extraordinary circumstances in future cases may cause a federal court
to grant such injunctive, declaratory or other equitable relief.
In addition, it should be noted that, in Younger, the Court based its
decision primarily on these concerns of equity and federalism, but did
discuss, in passing, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which provides: "A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."' 9 4 In the event that the defense seeks injunctive relief to
stay the state prosecution, the state prosecutor may seek to invoke 28
U.S.C. § 2283 as a limitation on the federal court's power.
Given the nature of this case, where important federalism and
separation of powers concerns form a backdrop, it is foreseeable thatwhether on arguments of bad faith, harassment, patent and flagrant
unconstitutionality, risk of multiple cases, or other federalism or
separation of powers extraordinary circumstances-former President
Bush might seek such an injunction or declaratory relief in federal court
even before a grand jury indictment, in addition to any efforts in state
court. We are uncertain as to the outcome of such an action by former
President Bush, but we doubt the courts would allow the blocking of the
grand jury proceedings of a credible prosecution. As to the nature of
such an action, while this situation by a former President would appear
unprecedented, logic would suggest that the arguments raised by the
former President would be based on constitutional or statutory defenses,
191. Id. at 53-54 (majority opinion) (quoting Buck v. Watson, 313 U.S. 387, 401 (1941))
(internal citation omitted).
192. Id. at 43-44.
193.

JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 277 (2006).

194. Younger, 401 U.S. at 40.
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analyzed in the next part, that would empower the federal court to

exercise its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
D. Defenses
We next briefly examine several defenses that former President Bush
might raise to seek dismissal of the case.'95
1. Federal Exclusive Domain
As was noted in State v. Jack,196 based on Skiriotes, it is possible for
state law to have extraterritorial effect. In this regard, the court in Jack
presented a tripartite mode of analysis of whether state criminal law
could reach acts which occurred outside the state, to wit: "(1) there must
be a sufficient state interest, (2) there can be no conflict with federal
law, and (3) the crime in question must not have been prosecuted by
federal authorities, or the authorities of a foreign jurisdiction."'l97
In regard to point (1), it would appear that the State of California
could establish a sufficient interest. In regard to point (2), an
examination of the potentially relevant congressional acts-18 U.S.C. §
956, 18 U.S.C. § 1117, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 ("1998
CongressionalResolution'), and the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 ("2002 Congressional
Resolution")-shows both the difficulties and possibilities of
demonstrating there is no conflict with federal law.198 In regard to point
(3), we are not aware of federal or foreign jurisdiction prosecution of
the crime in question. With regard to any other factors, we believe there
are credible arguments that support a state prosecution. We recognize
that such a state prosecution is unprecedented, but we do believe that
any California prosecutor would be able to argue in the appellate courts
the propriety of bringing such an indictment and prosecution on the
basis of the above analysis of the legal framework.
2. Federal Preemption
Another argument which might be raised is that state law in this area
is preempted by federal law. This is a slightly different argument than an
argument of federal exclusivity, as it focuses on direct preemption,
implied preemption, and field preemption. It would appear to us,
however, that the form of the analysis tracks well with the analysis in
195.
196.
197.
198.

An expanded analysis is available in Davis et al., supra note 5, at 41-80.
State v. Jack, 125 P.3d 311 (Alaska 2005).
Id. at 318-22 (citing to other cases).
An expanded analysis is available in Davis et al., supra note 5, at 45-60.
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the preceding part. The central question is whether this prosecution for
conspiracy to commit murder and murder based on "false pretenses" by
the former President outside the realm of his powers (whether
constitutional or congressional) lends itself to a clear preemption
analysis.
In particular, the constitutional requirement on the President to
"faithfully execute the laws" 99 provides a space, it would seem, for the
prosecution in the state forum for the "false pretenses" prosecution.
However, we would note that jurisprudence in this area is judge-made
and does not lend itself to clear delineations. We recognize that such a
state prosecution is unprecedented, but we do believe that any
California prosecutor would be able to argue in the appellate courts the
propriety of bringing such an indictment and prosecution on the basis of
the above analysis of the legal framework.
3. State Secrets Privilege (National Security)
Whether a former President or a former department head may assert
the State Secrets Privilege 2 00 once they have left office is unsettled. The
cases in which it has been asserted were started when the federal official
defendant was in office-though the federal official may have left
government by the time the case was decided. In the Executive
Privilege arena, which may be relevant, former Presidents are noted to
have asserted "that [they] continue to enjoy some constitutional power
after they leave office and can assert a privilege enjoyed by no other
private citizen." 201 One would expect a similar argument to be made by
the former President with regard to the State Secrets Privilege.
Obviously, discouraging a sitting President or head of department
from asserting such a privilege would narrow the question for the court
in the matter. Be that as it may, given the concerns of the sitting
President, it is possible that the State Secrets Privilege might be asserted
by a sitting President with regard to evidence in a criminal prosecution
of a former President. However, the significance to federalism of a
federal intervention by a sitting President on the basis of State Secrets to
attempt to block a state court criminal proceeding of a former President
should not be underestimated.
The reason that a sitting President might hesitate or be deterred from
199. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 703 (1952). This
statement is based on U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
200. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see generally Sudha Setty,
Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV.
201 (2009).
201. Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and Executive Privilege, 88 TEx. L. REv. 301,
302 (2009).
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such an action would be due to the fact that the state prosecutor is
representing a state and acting pursuant to vital state interests and
considers the former Executive of the federal government as having run
afoul of the most fundamental state criminal laws. Another view of the
State Secrets Privilege in our federalism is to ask whether this privilege
is exclusively a privilege of the federal government, or also a privilege
of the state, leading to federalism tensions on its wielding by one of our
dual sovereigns (in this case federal) to protect a former federal official
(in this case a former President) from the prosecution of another of our
dual sovereigns (in this case the state).
4. Executive Privilege
Given that former President Bush asserted in Executive Order
13,233 that a "former President[], Vice President[], and their heirs retain
absolute veto power over the incumbent President concerning the
privilege[,]" and that "if the former President asserts the privilege, the
incumbent President may not release the information absent court
order[,]" it is likely that former officials or the former President himself
may seek to assert Executive Privilege.20 2 The power of the former
President (and by extension the former officials on behalf of the former
President) to assert such Executive Privilege has been supported in
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, in which "the Court ruled
that a former President retains executive privilege at least with respect
to confidential communications and that he can assert that privilege in
court even over the objections of the incumbent President." 2
At the same time, the Court has recognized that assertions of
Executive Privilege are not fatal in a criminal prosecution setting, such
as in United States v. Nixon. Flowing from the proposed prosecution of
Nixon by special prosecutor Leon Jaworsky over Watergate, in an 8-0
ruling, with Rehnquist recusing himself, the Court stated that:
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in
the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.20 4
Thus, there is a likelihood that specific assertions of Executive
202. Id. at 303.
203. Id. at 306 (citing Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 447-49 (1977)).
204. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974).
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Privilege may be made by the former President in such state criminal
prosecution, and that the court will have to balance the interests present
with regard to ordering the production of such evidence.
5. Supremacy Clause Immunity
The Supreme Court's leading case on Supremacy Clause Immunity
is In re Neagle.2 0 5 No other Supremacy Clause case has been decided
since 1920, and modem Supremacy Clause Immunity has largely "been
developed in the lower federal courts." 206
In re Neagle is the celebrated case of a federal marshal (Neagle) who
was protecting Supreme Court Justice Field traveling on a train during
circuit duty in California.2 0 7 After a very belligerent former litigant in
the Justice's court (Terry), who had previously publicly threatened the
Justice's life, punched the Justice twice in the dining car, Neagle
ordered Terry to stop. 20 8 Neagle, believing Terry was reaching for a
Bowie knife, then shot and killed Tenry.209 Neagle was arrested and held
in state court for the murder of Terry. 0 Neagle sought a writ of habeas
corpus and, in affirming the grant of that writ, the Supreme Court held:
[I]f the prisoner is held in the state court to answer for an act
which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States,
which it was his duty to do as marshal of the United States, and if
in doing that act he did no more than what was necessary and
proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law
of the State of California. When these things are shown, it is
established that he is innocent of any crime against the laws of
the State, or of any other authority whatever. There is 211no
occasion for any further trial in the state court, or in any court.
The Court went on to hold that:
The result at which we have arrived upon this examination is, that
in the protection of the person and the life of Mr. Justice Field
while in the discharge of his official duties, Neagle was
authorized to resist the attack of Terry upon him; that Neagle was
correct in the belief that without prompt action on his part the
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
See Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d. 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006).
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 52-53.
Id. at 43-46, 52-53.
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
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assault of Terry upon the judge would have ended in the death of
the latter; that such being his well-founded belief, he was
justified in taking the life of Terry, as the only means of
preventing the death of the man who was intended to be his
victim; that in taking the life of Terry, under the circumstances,
he was acting under the authority of the law of the United States,
and was justified in so doing; and that he is not liable to answer
in the courts of California on account of his part in that
transaction. 212
In Clifton v. Cox, the Ninth Circuit held that the test for Supremacy
Clause Immunity for a federal official is whether his actions were (1)
within the scope of his authority and (2) necessary and proper under the
circumstances.2 13 In line with the functionalist discussion in In re
Neagle, the "within the scope of his authority" prong of the analysis is
not limited to express authority, but includes implied authority derived
from the Constitution and laws of the United States. Moreover, this
scope of authority covers mandatory duties but also applies with equal
force to discretionary acts at those levels of government where the
concept of duty encompasses the sound exercise of discretionary
authority. 214
Errors of judgment are not enough to meet this standard to avoid
dismissal. Meeting this standard would appear to require a showing that
the President was outside the outer perimeter of his scope of duties or
that his acts did not meet the necessary and proper standard. For that to
occur, the best evidence of the false pretenses would be to demonstrate
former President Bush knew or should have known that the facts as he
stated them to the American people were false based on what he knew
at the time. This demonstration would include the actions of those under
his authority or direction to "gin" up evidence that strained credulity;
those actions, undertaken to buttress the President's assertions about
Iraq and Saddam Hussein to garner the nation's approval to invade,
would be considered part of the conspiracy to commit murder or
murder. In addition, the language of In re Neagle and Clifton suggest
that evidence developed after the statements, which showed them to be
false, could be presented to address the reasonableness of the former
President's assertions.
6. Qualified Immunity
While Supremacy Clause Immunity and Qualified Immunity have
212. Id at 75-76 (emphasis added).
213. Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d. 722, 726-30 (9th Cir. 1977).
214. Id.
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different sources, it has been said that there is a functional similarity
between them-they both "reduce the inhibiting effect that a civil suit
or prosecution can have on the effective exercise of official duties by
enabling government officials to dispose of cases against them at an
early stage of litigation." 2 15 Qualified Immunity has been recognized in
private cases; the leading case on Qualified Immunity is Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.216
. We are not aware of this standard being applied with regard to
criminal prosecution. If it were argued that it should apply, and the court
was to reject Absolute Immunity for a former President but recognize
that Qualified Immunity should be present, the standard for Qualified
Immunity would apply. That standard is: "[G]overnment officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability
... insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." 217 Interpreting this standard in the current context, the "false
pretenses" evidence, as it was in the Supremacy Clause Immunity
setting, should be sufficiently compelling to overcome the reasonable
person standard.
In the last term, in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd,2 18 the Supreme Court
revisited a question of Qualified Immunity of a federal official. While in
the civil setting, the Court's discussion of the reasonable person
standard would appear relevant. Justice Scalia, writing on behalf of the
Court, notes that:
A Government official's conduct violates clearly established law
when, at the time of the challenged conduct, "[tlhe contours of
[a] right [are] sufficiently clear" that every "reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right."
We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate. The constitutional question in this case falls far short of
that threshold.2 19
If the standard described above for clearly established law applied
for the assertion of a Qualified Immunity defense to this state criminal
prosecution, then the evidence to support this prosecution would need to
overcome the hurdles of what a reasonable official would have
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
omitted).

Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F. 3d. 1211, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
Id. at 818.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
Id. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (citation
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understood. In addition, existing precedent must have placed the
220
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.
7. Political Question Doctrine
It would seem clear that should this issue be framed as one involving
national policy, the intent or motivation for involvement in armed
conflict, the prudence of such an action, or simply the defense of the
United States, it will be dismissed as a non-justiciable issue under the
Political Question Doctrine. As stated in El-Shifa, "[p]laintiffs . . . ask[]
us to review whether the President was justified in striking the E1-Shifa
plant. Courts have no business hearing such claims." 221
However, the court in Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger stated in dicta that
"[t]o be sure, we can imagine a case in which a rogue agent commits an
act so removed from his official duties that it cannot fairly be said to
represent the policy of the United States[.]" 222 Further, "[t]he doctrine
must be cautiously invoked, and the mere fact that a case touches on the
220. Further, while not part of the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
al-Kidd suggests a heightened requirement for "clearly established law" at the time of the
conduct in the national security setting, which might operate as a further constraint on a state
criminal prosecution to the extent that California law is argued by the defense to provide a less
stringent standard for conspiracy to commit murder or murder as compared with other states. Id.
at 2085 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further comparative law research between the various state
approaches to conspiracy to commit murder and murder might be prudent. Regardless of
whether Justice Kennedy's suggested approach is an intimation of a future Supreme Court
approach, what appears certain is that a state criminal prosecution would be of national
significance. This national significance would place an additional burden on the state criminal
prosecution, which raises the risk that a court might let prosper a defense argument to seek
dismissal based on something akin to still undefined exceptional circumstances. The defense
could focus on the possibility for criminal prosecution at the federal level under federal law,
asserting that the lack of investigation and prosecution at the federal level by prosecutors tasked
nationally militates against a state prosecutor examining these matters of national significance.
The argument might be made that the opening of an investigation at the federal level of the same
facts subject to the state criminal prosecution militates in favor of at least staying, if not outright
dismissing, the state court prosecution in this matter of national significance, pending the results
of the federal prosecution. We think the state prosecutor should keep uppermost in the court's
mind the significant interest for our federalism in preserving, rather than allowing the atrophy
of, the constitutional structure that provides the double security to the rights of the citizens. A
second point would be that, subject to the oversight by the federal court in the removal setting
(whether the case went forward in the federal court or pursuant to remand to the state court), the
state prosecution operates with significant autonomy from the federal prosecution, which inures
to the benefit of the citizens. The independent view by the state prosecutor of the evidence of
presidential criminality assures that the concerns of a sitting President for preserving
Presidential powers are balanced not only on a separation of powers plane but also on the
federalism plane of our constitution in a setting of significant alleged criminality in the actions
of a former President.
221. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 578, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
222. Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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political process does not . . . [automatically render it] beyond the

court's jurisdiction." 223 Obviously, as a practical matter, a sitting
president of the United States cannot be said to be acting for the good of
public policy or the country if he garners support for an ill-advised war,
against suggestions (indeed, factual findings) from his secuity advisors,
covert operatives and international allies, by misleading the American
public as to the reasons for instituting armed conflict.
Obviously, the issue must be framed as one of criminal behavior. The
true nature of the behavior was shielded from decision-makers and the
general public. Action was taken on the public's distorted perception of
what the facts truly were. If the criminal nature of President Bush's
actions are proved, we believe there will be no way to frame this issue
as anything but subterfuge for criminal activity, and thus the court will
have to preclude the application of the Political Question Doctrine, as
suggested in Gonzalez- Vera.
8. Other Issues
The Act of State doctrine, for which the leading case is Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,224 would apply to the criminal
prosecution of former President Bush in the event that evidence is
marshaled from other allies of the United States as part of the state's
case. In such a circumstance, it would be prudent to make sure thatexpressly or impliedly-the court is not asked to stand in judgment on
the validity of those Acts of State of the other states in their own
territory.
One point that does not lend itself to easy analysis in the domestic
law setting is whether, when immunities are asserted by the former
President with regard to the state prosecution, the state prosecutor
would invoke international law obligations on the United States
(including the former President) at the time of the false pretenses in a
situation where the former President would not have the power to
interpret these obligations (that power resting with the sitting President).
In particular, the general view as a matter of international law is that the
Head of State is immune from prosecution for all acts in office (rationae
personae)and, after they have left office, for all acts done in an official
capacity while in office (rationaemateriae). If a former President were
asserting broad immunities-that is, rationae personae-that were
incompatible with levels of immunity foreseen under international law
obligations of the United States for former Heads of States-that is,
223. In re Nazi Era Cases Against Ger. Defs. Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001)
(citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927); Can. v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d
Cir. 1994)).
224. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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rationaemateriae-the state prosecutor might seek to comfort his or her
domestic law arguments by demonstrating the compatibility between
these arguments and international law understandings of the extent and
limits of former Head of State immunity and criminality.
While the role of international law in U.S. domestic courts is a
complex topic, the general view known as the Charming Betsey view
tries to interpret congressional acts consistent with international law
obligations if at all possible. 2 25 This Charming Betsey approach would
suggest that each congressional act, such as the 1998 and 2002
Congressional Resolutions, would if at all possible be best interpreted as
consistent with international law obligations on the United States. As a
result, acts by the former President that were in violation of the
international law obligations of the United States (rising to the level of
international criminality) might then be further evidence to buttress the
arguments in favor of finding domestic state criminality.
The analysis of the types of defenses that might be presented in this
part note a number of significant hurdles, but not necessarily
insurmountable ones, that might be confronted by such a state criminal
prosecution of a former President.
VII. THE NORMATIVE QUESTION: SHOULD A STATE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION OF FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH BE DONE?

We believe that it is important for a state prosecutor to bring this
prosecution of former President Bush because the evidence is
compelling that Americans were killed in Iraq after being misled into a
war. We do not in any manner wish to diminish the loss of Iraqis in this
discussion, but we think it would be difficult for a U.S. state court to
reach those deaths because the state interest is less clear, and those
deaths are of people under the protection of the Iraqi state, not
Americans under the protection of the United States.
We think of this prosecution as a means of honoring the enormous
sacrifice of our uniformed soldiers who are asked, at the request of the
Commander-in-Chief, to go into harm's way to protect America. Many
of those who have gone into harm's way are our classmates, students,
and people to whom we have other close ties. Those uniformed soldiers
have only limited bases under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
question the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. That there is
compelling evidence that they, and all other Americans, were misled
into their noble sacrifice by former President Bush suggests that
225. See generally Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
Authorizationsfor the Use of Force,InternationalLaw, and the Charming Betsey Cannon, 46
B.C. L. REv. 293, 298 (2005).
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meaningful accountability for the civilian leader is important as a
marker for current generations and future generations about how a
President can use his or her power.
We think that it is important that the distinction between errors of
judgment by a President and false pretenses by a President begin to be
delineated through such a prosecution so that the gravity of the decision
to take the country to war is reinforced in the minds of the federal
government and the American people. We see this prosecution as a
means of vindicating the rights of the people by providing a mechanism
for the kind of double security of the people's rights that was envisioned
by the Framers of our Constitution.
If this prosecution is pursued, we expect that there will be many who
will argue that such a prosecution will have dire effects on the United
States. We do not believe so. On the domestic side, such a prosecution
will provide a public record under oath of the evidence of the crime. We
see the deliberative judicial process as providing the sober environment
necessary for addressing such a serious crime. With all of the guarantees
of our criminal justice system present, we see a process in which both
judicial forms and judicial norms 226 will be respected.
We know that other countries have faced difficult moments:
Argentina after the generals, Chile after Pinochet, France after the
Occupation.227 Yet, with courage and lucidity they have managed or are
managing to address the grave crimes that occurred in their countries.
We think that the Framers provided a Constitution that permits us to do
the same. Where the separation of powers has not functioned well,
federalism may provide the security to the rights of the people.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the legal issues relating to a state criminal
226. Justice Robert Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, Speech to the American
Society of International Law Annual Meeting, April 13, 1945, available at http://www.roberth
jackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/the-rule-of-lawamong-nations/ (paraphrasing speech).
The ultimate principle is that you must put no man on trial under the forms [of]
judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty.
If you are determined to execute a man in any case, there is no occasion for a
trial; the world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict.
Id.
227.

See generally PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE (Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger eds.,

2009); KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: How HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011).
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prosecution as a means to achieve accountability through
complementarity in our federalism for the instigation of the War in Iraq.
Provided the necessary factual evidence can be brought together by the
prosecutor, we are of the view that a state criminal prosecution is
consistent with the U.S. obligations under international law. We also are
of the view that a state criminal prosecution is consistent with
presidential war powers. Such a prosecution is also consistent with
complementarity and reassures Americans by having an American jury
in an American state court applying American law pass on the
criminality of a former President. This domestic state prosecution
vindicates the international rule on the Crime of Aggression without the
need for a foreign or international tribunal assertion of universal
jurisdiction.228 We also find that, based on a California criminal
prosecution that might serve as a template, a state criminal prosecution
is possible, and there is an answer to each of the hurdles that might be
raised as a defense. As a normative matter, we believe such a state
criminal prosecution should be done.

228. It might also show how domestic law might effectively vindicate the Crime of
Aggression without implementing legislation for the Kampala Amendments to the Statute of the
International Criminal Court or universal jurisdiction worries. Cf Michael P. Scharf, Universal
Jurisdictionand the Crime ofAggression, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (2012).
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